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University of St. Gallen
In Rational Fools, Amartya Sen (1977) put forward a piercing critique
of rational choice theory. The argument hinges on the distinction
between three types of motivation – (narrow) self-interest, sympathy, and
commitment. One acts from self-interest when one aims at maximizing
one’s welfare, where welfare is understood as depending exclusively on
the goods enjoyed by oneself. Sympathy requires us to depart from such
a narrow conception of welfare. One acts from sympathy when one’s
own welfare is affected by how others are doing – for example, when
helping others makes one feel better. As such, sympathy can fairly easily
be accommodated in rational choice theory. Commitment, by contrast,
refers to a kind of behavior which is motivationally unrelated to the
agent’s welfare, however broadly deﬁned. One acts from commitment,
for example, when one feels compelled to intervene in a certain matter,
even if doing so leaves one worse-off. Committed action, according to Sen,
cannot be integrated into the standard account of rational choice. In his
laterwork, Senhas further elaboratedand indeed radicalizedhisdiagnosis.
The possibility of commitment, according to Sen (1985), not only breaks
the standard model’s link between choice and welfare, it also requires us
to depart from the much more general assumption that a person’s choices
reﬂect his or her own goals.
Because commitments play an important role in human behavior,
Sen’s critique challenges the explanatory power of rational choice theory.
Moreover, it raises a question about the nature of rationality itself. The
“rational fool” of Sen’s essay is rational only in the skewed notion of eco-
nomic theory; in the eyes of those who take a more adequate view of
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rationality, it is plain that he is no more than a simple fool. Three con-
secutive steps can thus be identiﬁed in Sen’s critique: (i) render plausible
the importance of commitments in human behavior; (ii) demonstrate that
rational choice theory – at least in the interpretation favored by most
economists – cannot accommodate committed action, and (iii) argue for
the need to develop a theory of rationality in action that is not marked by
this ﬂaw.
How to account for the rationality of committed action is still very
much an open question. To explore this issue, we organized a workshop
at the University of St. Gallen in May 2004.1 The papers gathered in this
Symposium were written for this occasion. The Symposium opens with
Amartya Sen’s keynote address to the workshop. Sen’s paper provides,
ﬁrst, a brief summary of his critique of rational choice theory. Its main
emphasis, however, is on arguing for the importance of accommodating
commitment in a theory of rational action.
The next two papers are by Philip Pettit and Dan Hausman. Both
authors sympathize with the general thrust of Sen’s writings on rational
choice theory. In particular, they accept the ﬁrst step of Sen’s critique,
emphasizing that commitment is an important category of human action
that economists have unduly tended to neglect. They do not, however,
endorse the second step of Sen’s argument. According to Philip Pettit,
there is a fundamental ﬂaw in the standard interpretation of rational choice
theory, which he sees at work even in Sen’s critique. He argues that an
alternative interpretation of rational choice theory – one that distinguishes
between what he calls “phenomenal” and “non-phenomenal” desires –
can accommodate committed action.
Dan Hausman, too, defends rational choice theory against Sen’s
critique. He argues, ﬁrst, that we should be prescriptive about the notion
of preferences. Preferences should speciﬁcally be interpreted as “all-
things-considered rankings.” We can then introduce a clear distinction
between the preferences themselves and the factors that inﬂuence their
development. Commitment, in Hausman’s view, is one of these factors.
Our “all-things-considered rankings”will depend, among other things, on
our commitments. For Hausman, commitments can thus be incorporated
in rational choice theory, which is to say that he rejects the second step of
Sen’s critique.
Unlike Pettit and Hausman, Hans Bernhard Schmid, in this
ﬁnal paper of the Symposium, accepts all three steps of Sen’s critique.
He is particularly concerned with the third step, that is, with the
1 We coorganized the workshop together with Dieter Thoma¨. The organizers wish to express
their gratitude to the Swiss National Research Foundation, The International Students’
Committee Foundation and the Research Foundation of the University of St. Gallen for
their generous support of this workshop.
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question of how commitment can be incorporated in an alternative theory
of rational action. Schmid follows up on an argument put forward by
Elizabeth Anderson in an earlier symposium on Sen’s work in this journal,
which links the rationality of committed action to the structure of collective
intentions andactions (Anderson2001).He examines Sen’s claim– strongly
objected to by Pettit in his paper – that in committed action, agents do
not base their choices on their own goals. According to Schmid, this
claim makes perfect sense with regard to collective goals. He argues that
Sen’s critique could pave the way towards a more adequate (and less
individualistic) theory of social action.
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